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Static system-call graph generation
ABSTRACT
Certain techniques for testing for the presence of malicious code within executables are
based on the observation that system calls (syscalls) are a main pathway for exploits. The
problem of generating a graph of syscalls of an executable is thus of importance in computer
security. The present disclosure describes the generation of the syscall graph of a binary
executable given a control flow graph of the executable. Along with a syscall graph, a set of
potential asynchronous entry points into the graph is also returned.
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BACKGROUND
Certain techniques for testing for the presence of malicious code within executables are
based on the observation that system calls (syscalls) are a main pathway for exploits. The
problem of generating a graph of syscalls of an executable is thus of importance in computer
security.
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DESCRIPTION
Given a control flow graph (CFG) of a binary executable file, the techniques of this
disclosure efficiently derive a syscall graph together with a set of potential asynchronous entry
points into the graph.

Fig. 1: Generating a syscall graph given a CFG
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Fig. 1 illustrates generating a system call graph of a binary executable given the control
flow graph of the executable. The condensation of the CFG is computed (102) in order to
convert all mutually recursive functions into single graph nodes, resulting in a directed acyclic
graph. Each node in this directed acyclic graph has a unique identifier. The condensation is
topologically sorted (104). Within each inlineable recursive function group, completed
functions are tracked. Conversely, for each completed function, the recursive function group
that includes it is tracked. A function is only complete when all the functions in the mutually
recursive function group are complete. A recursive function group tracks the identifiers of the
nodes it contains. The topological sort assures that calls to upstream functions (which are
incomplete) are not encountered, while downstream functions are complete. Thus, only
functions within the current node are potentially incomplete but callable.
The nodes of the condensation are iterated through, starting with the most downstream
nodes (106). A new inlineable recursive function group is created for a node (108), and is
populated with fresh entry and exit nodes for each function it contains. For each function in a
node, a subgraph is created (110) for each of its basic blocks, linking them with epsilon
transitions according to the control flow. In this context, an epsilon transition is a no-operations
transition, e.g., in the sense of automata theory, one that occurs without consuming an input
symbol. Within a basic block, control flow is sequential except in the case of function calls.
Instructions within basic blocks are translated to transitions as follows:
1. Most instructions are converted to epsilon transitions or omitted altogether.
2. An assembly-level syscall instruction is mapped to the corresponding system call.
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3. A function call through the procedure linkage table is mapped to a system call based on
the name of the imported function.
4. A function call instruction is mapped to the subgraph corresponding to its target as
follows.
a. If the function is in the current recursive group an epsilon transition is added to
the function's entry node and from its exit node.
b. Otherwise the called function is treated as if it were inlined by making a copy of
its recursive function group in the current recursive function group. The copy is
linked in with an epsilon transition added to its entry node and from its exit
node.
When all the functions in this node have been processed, they are added to the mapping of
functions to recursive function groups (112). The node-id is incremented to the immediate
upstream node (114), and if nodes are left (116), iteration through the condensation continues.
In this context, an upstream node corresponds to a node that is not downstream. For
example, consider a graph with node a that has two child-nodes b and c, resulting in a
topological sort [a, b, c]. A movement from node c to node b is considered an upstream
movement, even though nodes b and c are siblings in the graph-theoretic sense.
When the nodes of the condensation are exhausted, a syscall graph is created (118) for
the output, as follows. Each recursive function group is moved into it by moving its transitions
and adding each of its function start nodes to the graph's entry points. As a result of the
condensation, a function can only call other functions that are either within the same node or in
more downstream nodes. This means that functions can have their CFGs inlined into upstream

https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/1272

5

Boulgakov: Static system-call graph generation

callers, which effectively provides return address tracing and produces a more accurate CFG.
Keeping track of node identifiers within recursive function groups allows new node identifiers
to be assigned efficiently with a single update pass over the transitions. The techniques are
optimized by storing each recursive function group's transitions into a graph as they are added,
by additionally recording the first and last nodes in the subgraph, and the parent graph, within
each recursive function group.
The techniques of this disclosure can be applied to analyze executable or shared library
files to determine if such executables include malicious code that attempts to exploit known
vulnerabilities. Such data can be used in making security-related decisions about the
executables. Online application stores or other platforms that offer third-party applications or
software can use the techniques to test software that is submitted for download or sale to
end-users. The techniques also find applicability in the computer security industry, e.g., within
anti-virus, anti-malware, and other security products.
CONCLUSION
Certain techniques for testing for the presence of malicious code within executables are
based on the observation that system calls (syscalls) are a main pathway for exploits. The
problem of generating a graph of syscalls of an executable is thus of importance in computer
security. The present disclosure describes the generation of the syscall graph of a binary
executable given a control flow graph of the executable. Along with a syscall graph, a set of
potential asynchronous entry points into the graph is also returned.

Published by Technical Disclosure Commons, 2018

6

Defensive Publications Series, Art. 1272 [2018]

REFERENCES
[1] T. Gibson-Robinson, P. Armstrong, A. Boulgakov, A. W. Roscoe, “FDR3: A parallel
refinement checker for CSP,” Int. J. Softw. Tools Technol. Transfer (2016) 18: 149, available
online at https://doi.org/10.1007/s10009-015-0377-y
[2] P. Ryan, S. Schneider, M. Goldsmith, G. Lowe, A. W. Roscoe, “Modelling and analysis of
security protocols: the CSP approach,” Addison-Wesley (2001)
[3] A. Boulgakov, T. Gibson-Robinson, A. W. Roscoe, “Computing maximal weak and other
bisimulations”, Formal Aspects of Computing 28(2) pp. 381-407
[4] A. Boulgakov, “Improving Scalability of Exploratory Model Checking,” PhD thesis,
University of Oxford, 2016, available online at
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:76acb8bf-52e7-4078-ab4f-65f3ea07ba3d
[5] A. W. Roscoe, “The theory and practice of concurrency,” Prentice Hall NJ (1997)
[6] Boulgakov, Alexandre, “Efficient multi-graph or rooted subgraph matching via merging,”
Technical Disclosure commons, (June 18, 2018). Available online at
https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/1252

https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/1272

7

